After examining both the interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index, it was found that the open-to-open return variance is consistently greater than the close-to-close variance. Examining the volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests with five-minute intervals reveals an Lshaped pattern, or more precisely, two L-shaped patterns, starting with a small hump during both the morning and the afternoon sessions, with the morning session having a much higher interday volatility than the afternoon session. This L-shaped interday volatility is supported by the similarly shaped intraday volatility pattern. This result suggests that the high volatility of intraday returns for the market open is not entirely due to the trading mechanisms (call auction in the market opening) but also due to both the accumulated overnight information and the trading halt effect. The five-minute breaks after the auction and blind auction procedures are the two major driving forces which exaggerate the high intraday volatility observed at the market open.
Stock Exchange 1 Introduction
A very important issue in market microstructure analysis is the interaction between trading procedures and security price formation. The latter is associated closely with the evolution of security's return volatilities. Empirical studies on the interdaily evolution of return volatilities typically find that daily open-to-open volatility is higher than daily close-to-close volatility. Three general explanations have been offered for this phenomenon: the difference in trading mechanism between the market's open and close (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987) , the monopoly power of the specialist (Stoll and Whaley, 1990) , and the long halt of trade before the market's open (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991) .
In this article, we examine the behaviour of both interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index in order to shed additional light on the issue. There have been no empirical studies made on the microstructure of the Chinese stock markets using intraday data. China's stock exchanges are relatively new players amongst the world's financial markets. The two official stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, were established in December 1990 and July 1991 respectively. Since their establishment, they have expanded rapidly in terms of capitalization, turnover, and number of firms listed. In terms of market capitalization, the Chinese stock markets are now the second largest in the AsiaPacific region after Japan, and are ahead of such major markets as Australia, Hong Kong and Korea (Eun and Huang, 2005) . Recently, in order to liberalize its stock markets, China's domestic equity markets were opened to selected international institutional investors, designated as the so-called qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in 2003. The market capitalization of the SHSE was 3,009.7 billion yuan (about US$367 billion) in 2003, 77.8% of total market capitalization in all Chinese stock markets. It is obvious that the SHSE plays a dominating role in Chinese stock markets, which is also the reason why the Shanghai Composite Index was selected for this study.
Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE is a limited order-driven market using electronic trading without market makers. However, the SHSE is unique in its institutional setting. among both academics and policy makers (Wang et al 2005, p. 7) . In addition, unlike many other emerging markets which have stronger equity market integration with major markets such as through dual listing of Hong Kong stocks on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), Chinese stock markets are relatively isolated and more independent than other markets. Therefore, the markets provide a clear and simple case for the research of the relations between volatility and trading mechanisms because there is much less correlation of both the return and return volatility between the SHSE and other markets, which affects the pattern of broadly follow a U-shaped pattern (Wood et al., 1985) while the volatility of returns broadly follows an L-shaped pattern. This result is consistent with the previous findings on the Hong Kong market (Lam and Tong, 1999; Tang and Lui, 2002 ).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review on interday and intraday return volatility; Section 3 discusses the institutional background for the SHSE and the data; Section 4 reports and analyses the empirical results; In Section 5, a conclusion is made.
Literature Review
In an early study on the NYSE, Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) compare the effects of a call auction market and continuous trading market on return volatility. The opening procedure of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is essentially a call auction mechanism while all other trades are by the continuous trading mechanism. In the call auction mechanism, the buy and sell orders accumulated overnight are executed at a single price at the market opening. They reported that the interdaily stock returns computed using open-toopen prices have greater variance and show more evidence of reversals than comparable returns computed from close-to-close prices. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) attribute the result to differences in trading mechanisms between the opening and closing transactions and Stoll and Whaley (1990) to-open volatility, and conclude that it is caused by the preceding long period of non-trading rather than the trading mechanism. Similarly, Amihud et al (1990) found that on the Milan Stock Exchange, where the market opens with continuous trading and moves to a call market, the call trading actually exhibits lower volatility. It is also consistent with Choe and Shin's (1993) 
findings in the Korean
Stock Exchange (KSE) that the close-to-close volatility is higher when the market closes (in the morning) in continuous trade than when the market closes (in the morning) in call auction.
All the above-mentioned markets, including the NYSE, the AMEX, the LSE, and Asian markets including Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), the KSE and the SHSE to be discussed in this paper, open with a call market and then switch to a continuous market. Unlike these markets, the SEHK opens as a continuous market and remains a continuous market up to and including the close of trading. Hence, halt of trade seems more likely to be the driving force rather than a call auction process as argued by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) . Overall, although there is still no consensus, the majority of the research works support the notion that it is overnight trading halt rather than an auction procedure that is the source of the higher open interday volatility.
In addition to the examination of the interday return volatility, intraday return volatility of share prices has been found to follow a particular pattern, which is associated with the market microstructure characteristics of the stock exchange. Wood et al. (1985) are the first to identify the distinct U-shaped return and return volatility pattern over the trading day. Later, both Harris (1986) and Jain and Joh (1988) reported a significant U-shaped intraday return and return volatility patterns in stock trading in the NYSE.
Recently, Ozenbas, et al (2002) have examined intraday share price volatility over the year 2000 for five markets: the NYS, Nasdaq, the LSE, Euronext Paris and Deutsche Borse. They observed a U-shaped intraday volatility pattern, a particularly sharp spike for the opening half hour, and a general level of intraday volatility that is accentuated vis-à-vis volatility over longer differencing intervals in each of these markets. They suggest that the volatility accentuation is attributable to spreads, market impact, price discovery and momentum trading.
The theoretical explanations for the behaviour of these variables of the Ushaped patterns are not easy. Kyle (1985) suggests that traders can be classified into three classes: private information traders, random liquidity traders, and market makers. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) add a fourth type of trader to Kyle's model: discretionary liquidity traders. They take into account the impact, the costs, the size and the time of the trade. They suggest that public and private information, and trading noise are the causes of a systematic pattern in return volatilities, which leads traders to minimize trading during the periods of the open and close of the market.
When public information is released during the non-trading period (overnight), the liquidity traders (random liquidity traders and discretionary liquidity traders) would be more active at the open of the market. When the market is near to close, the informed traders, who get access to private information during the trading hours, would be more active towards the close of trading before the information becomes public during the overnight non-trading periods. This public/private information and noise trading hypotheses are well supported by the empirical evidence of a U-shaped pattern in return volatilities (French and Roll, 1986 and Stoll and Whaley, 1990) .
In addition to the evidence from the US market, there are some studies on 
Trading Systems and Dataset

Trading Systems
The trading system in the SHSE is based on the electronic consolidated open limit order book (COLOB). Trading is carried out on the exchange in two sessions: the morning session from 09:30 to 11:30 and the afternoon session from 13:00 to 15:00. Before the morning session, there is a 10-minute open call (consolidated) auction session, which starts at 09:15 and ends at 09:25, for the determination of the centralized competitive opening price. During this 10-minute call auction period, investors can place limit orders and participate in the opening auction, but no orders will be allowed to be withdrawn during this period of time.
There is also no information regarding order books available to investors during the auction process, except for the final clearing price generated at the end of the auction. Therefore, the morning call auction is totally without any information There are no designated dealers (specialists) to intervene in trading in the market. Investors place their orders with the brokers in the form of either a market order or limit order, and only good-to-day limit orders are accepted by the trading system. At the end of the trading day, all orders are purged from the COLOB.
There are no other sophisticated order types, such as trading-at-open, trading-atclose, stop orders, buy-at-minus and sell-at-plus, which are supported by the trading system. The minimum tick sizes for all stocks are 1 cent (RMB0.01
Yuan). Shares can't be sold on the same day once they are bought. The minimum trading size for purchase is 100 shares, while there is no minimum requirement for selling shares. Floor trading among member brokers, and short selling are strictly prohibited. During trading sessions on the SHSE, a stock is allowed to trade at a price plus or minus 10% from the previous day's closing price in order to avoid sharp price increases caused by 'buy manias' and sharp declines caused by 'sell panics'.
Overall, the operation of the SHSE is different from some other twosession order-driven markets. For example, the SEHK has a thoroughly continuous order-driven (i.e. no opening call market) trading, while in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the periodic auction is used twice a day at the opening of both the morning and afternoon session and continuous order-driven trading markets in both the morning and the afternoon sessions in the trading day. In addition, there are also some differences in trading rules such as price limit, tick size and shortselling restriction between the SHSE and those more similar order-driven Asian markets. The Chinese stock markets are also different from all the other markets with morning auction opening procedure: not only due to the fact that there is no specialists involved in the markets, but also the Chinese stock markets take fiveminute break between the periodic auction and the morning session with continuous trading mechanism.
A further difference lies in the broader nature of the trading environment.
Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE has a relative immature infrastructure such as an inadequate disclosure, an opaque legal and governance framework, and an inexperienced regulator. The co-existence of an inexperienced regulator with a limited number of informed investors with financial strength, and an enormous member of uninformed and unprotected investors with budget constraint, gives informed investors an opportunity to manipulate stock prices to earn a profit at the expense of the uninformed investors (Lu and Lee, 2004) .
Dataset
This paper uses intraday data from the Shanghai Composite Price Index, which is a value weighted index of all common stocks listed on the SHSE transactions, including the code, the order of time interval, the trading date, the day, trading time, the opening value, the highest value, the lowest value and the closing value in each time interval in each trading day.
Returns
Interday returns are calculated as the logarithmic percentage returns of the Intraday interval returns are computed by taking the first difference of the natural logarithm of the successive interval values of the indices. R t , the return on stock indices at the interval t, is computed as ln (P t / P t-1 ), where, for each interval during the trading day, P t is the closing value of the interval at time t and P t-1 is the closing value of proceeding interval at time t-1.
As there are two sessions in the trading day, the 5-minute returns consist of 48 observations over the two sessions from 09:30 to 11:30 and from 13:00 to 15:00 in a trading day with 34,368 observations over the three years. The first and In the study, parametric tests, such as the mean equality test, and the non- trading. However, the arrangement of a five-minute break between the call auction and the beginning of the continuous trading is more than necessary and should be cancelled due to the extra volatility created by this mechanism which certainly fails to improve the market quality.
[Insert Table 1 To a much lesser extent, a high level of interday volatility at the afternoon market open could also be attributed to the lack of trading continuity and the information accumulated during that lunch break. The effect of these factors should be much less than the other two breaks due to the statistical insignificance of the high volatility ratio tests during the afternoon open.
Volatility in Trading and non-Trading Periods
Studies focused on the volatility in trading and non-trading periods will help us to understand the price formation of security and its association with trading mechanisms the exchange adopts. Existing studies found that the return variance in the active trading hours (open-to-close) of the security market is larger than that in the nontrading hours (close-to-open) (French and Roll, 1986; Barclay, el al, 1990; Stoll and Whaley, 1990 ). French and Roll (1986) test the private information hypothesis and report that return variances are reduced by both the election day closing and the exchange holidays, whereas Barclay et al. (1990) support the same hypothesis using an opposite case in which return variances are increased by Saturday trading on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The large difference between the variances of the trading and the non-trading periods is mainly attributable to the greater intensity of information arriving during the business hours. Table 2 [Insert Table 2 ]
In Table 2 , we show that the volatility in terms of the variance of the opento-close period is more than four times that of the close-to-open (overnight) period (1.703% versus 0.388%). This is consistent with the U.S. results as reported by Lockwood and Linn (1990) in that the open-to-close return variance exceeds that of close-to-open return by a factor of 2.34 to 3.37. The results also support the hypothesis that private information is disclosed during trading hours. It should be noted that the return volatility in the morning trading session (0.604%) is greater than the volatility measured during the afternoon trading session (0.529%). This confirms further that private information is not produced at a constant rate even during the trading period. It also implies fewer price reversals occur as trade proceeds.
In terms of unit time volatility, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find that the two-hour midday break in Japan has a higher return volatility than the overnight break. They argue that this difference could result from the greater intensity of information arrival during the day compared to the overnight period.
In contrast, Lam and Tong (1999) show that an overnight variance of 0.027 is more than double the midday break variance of 0.001 in terms of unit time volatility. They argue that the higher overnight variance was attributed to probably the trading of some component stocks in London overnight. The results in Amihud and Mendelson's (1991) and theirs to the fact the former looked at individual stocks instead of looking at a stock index. Individual stocks tend to exhibit negative autocorrelation due to the bid-ask bounce, whereas stock indices tend to exhibit positive correlation due to various reasons (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990 ). would reject the null hypothesis of normality. These indicated that the returns data is non-normal and has a fat-tailed distribution on the Chinese stock market.
Intraday Return and volatility
[Insert Table 3 The right-hand plot of Figure 2 show that there are large, positive mean returns at the beginning of the trading day and a big upward increase in returns at the end of the trading day, which presents typical U-shaped patterns. These intraday effects are consistent with the previous literature on the US market (Wood et al, 1985; Harris, 1986; Jain and Joh, 1988; Lockwood and Linn, 1990) and other countries such as the Hong Kong market (Cheung, 1995) and the Turkish market (Bildik, 2001) . It is interesting to see these price changes (high returns) in the morning open in the Shanghai index. Possible reasons are the overnight halt of trade and the effect of accumulated information released, which reflects the new price-discovery process, and the high returns at the trading closing can be attributed to informed traders with private information for the next day's opening. Different informed and uninformed traders may lead to new price discovery. In addition, large closing returns imply that the specialist-related explanation of Miller (1989) should be refuted in the Chinese stock market since there is no specialist system. The findings show that the large price changes at market openings and closings needs to be improved in the Chinese exchange, which underscores the importance of making the trading systems more efficient.
In Table 4 , results of the F-tests for the equality of mean return show that the null hypothesis for equality of intraday returns across the 5-minute intervals is rejected at a 1% level. The results of KW-tests for the equality of mean return median confirm that the null hypothesis for equality of intraday return medians across the 5-minute intervals is also rejected at a 1% level. Both the F-tests and KW-tests have consistent results. This result confirms that there is a strong systematic intraday return pattern existing on the Chinese stock market. It should be noted that the first two intervals from 09:30 to 09:35 and from 09:35 to 09:40 of the morning session are significantly important at a 1% level for the index.
[Insert Table 4 ] Table 5 and Figure 2 present the standard deviation of the mean 5-minute returns. With the largest volatility at the beginning of the morning session, the two indices have distinct L-shaped patterns, inconsistent with the U-shaped patterns observed in the US market by Wood et al. (1985) , Harris (1986) , Jain and Joh (1988) and Goodhart and O'Hara (1997) ).
[Insert Table 5]
The mean volatility of 0.363% during the opening, or the first 5-minute interval, is almost triple that of the rest of the day. Volatility goes down sharply during the next 25 minutes. The lowest volatility of 0.096% occurs before the 5-minute ending of the morning session. The volatility begins to rise in the last 5-minutes of the morning session to 0.123%. At the beginning of the afternoon session volatility continues to rise to a higher level, 0.194%, in the first 5 minutes, which represents the largest volatility throughout the afternoon session. After that it comes down again (with lowest 0.093% at 13:20) and fluctuates until the end of the day to 0.116%, which is 1/3 of its value at the opening. A large opening volatility supports the fact that the mean return at the opening is significantly higher than that of most other intervals during the day.
In Table 5 , the results from the Levene- close in the afternoon session, which is not consistent with the pattern documented in the US market -rather it is consistent with the Hong Kong market (Lam and Tong, 1999; Tang and Lui, 2002) . One possible reason is that the market portfolio's rebalancing force, which causes higher volatility at the close in the US market, does not exist on the Chinese market. The size of the market portfolio funds for investors is still fairly small and the management of these funds is still relatively premature compared to their western counterparts.
Conclusion
The object of this paper is to examine the behaviour of interday and intraday return and return volatility in the SHSE, which is a limit order-driven markets using electronic trading without market makers.
The volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests suggest an L- This L-shaped interday volatility is also supported by the similarly shaped intraday volatility pattern, while intraday returns do actually follow the U-shaped pattern as suggested by Wood et al. (1985) . The noticeable L-shaped volatility pattern is due to flow of information and market microstructure, which are related to the generation and dissemination of information, the arrival of orders and the rules and institutional features of a stock market that determine how orders are transformed into trades.
Overnight information has an enormous impact on stock volatility. This implies that accumulated information (public and private) from overnight is reflected in prices immediately at the opening of the day. Therefore, in contrast to other 5-minute intraday price changes that reflect the news released during the corresponding 5-minute interval, the first few 5-minute return volatilities reflect the assimilating information that was released and accumulated due to a much longer overnight trading halt. These abnormal trading activities of different traders in the market's opening are related to their different information (public and private) that causes the L-shaped volatility in the markets. Meanwhile, there is wide spread manipulation due to its special shareholding structure and general trading environment. Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE has a relatively immature infrastructure such as an inadequate disclosure system, an opaque legal and governance framework and an inexperienced regulator. The co-existence of an inexperienced regulator with a limited number of informed investors with financial strength, and an enormous number of uninformed and unprotected investors with budget constraints, gives informed investors an opportunity to manipulate stock prices to earn a profit at the expense of the uninformed investors (Lu and Lee, 2004) .
The market makers such as the specialists on the NYSE and, to a lesser extent, dealers in the LSE are involved markedly at the market call auction in order to exploit monopolist profits due to the asymmetric information between them and normal liquidity providers. Chinese insiders and manipulators were not able to do this presumably because there is no sufficient liquidity during the open process. Instead, Chinese insiders and manipulators intend to manipulate market prices by placing and withdrawing their offers during the call auction process and when the market opens. That is the reason for a higher volatility at these two opens in the morning.
Having the blind auction reduced an auction's role of producing an effective market clearing price at the end of the auction, since it pushes away many uninformed investors who are instead choosing to participate in the more transparent continuous trading period. Moreover, the five-minute break after auction creates another trading halt effect. This trading halt effect does not necessarily lead to an accumulation of substantial information during such a short period of time compared to the overnight halt but rather brings uncertainty into the market when it opens again. In addition to the delaying the participation of uninformed small investors from the blind auction, the interday volatility at the market open at 09.30 thus reaches its highest level during a trading day.
In conclusion, the high volatilities observed at the market open are costly to the market in aggregate, which discourages trade and make investors' returns more uncertain. The five-minute break after the auction and blind auction procedure itself are the two major reasons for the high intraday volatility observed. Converting the blind procedure into a transparent one and eliminating the five-minute break after the auction should improve the market quality in terms of lower volatility at the market open. 
